CHAPTER TWO: AVIRODHA ADHYAYA
Section 2: Samudayadhikaranam: Topic 4 (Sutras 18-27)
Refutation of the Bauddha Realists.
Samudaya ubhayahetuke'pi tadapraptih II.2.18 (189)
Even if the (two kinds of) aggregates proceed from their two causes, there would take place non-establishment (of the two aggregates).
Samudaya: the aggregate; Ubhayahetuke: having two causes; Api: also, even; Tadapraptih: it will not take place, it cannot be established.
After refuting the atomic theory of Vaiseshika, the Buddhistic theories are now refuted.
Lord Buddha had four disciples who founded four systems of philosophy, called respectively Vaibhashika, Sautrantika, Yogachara and Madhyamika. The Vaibhashikas are the Realists (Sarvastitvavadins) who accept the reality of both the outside and the inside world consisting respectively of external objects and thought (also consciousness, feelings, etc.). The Sautrantikas are the Idealists (Vijnanavadins). They hold that thought alone is real. They maintain that there is no proof whether external objects really exist or not, the ideas only exist and the external objects are inferred from these ideas. Thus the Vaibhashikas hold that the external objects are directly perceived while the Sautrantikas maintain that the outward world is an inference from ideas. The third class, the Yogacharas hold that ideas alone are real and there is no external world corresponding to these ideas. The outward objects are unreal like dream objects.
The Madhyamikas maintain that even the ideas themselves are unreal and there is nothing that exists except the void (Sunyam). They are the Nihilists or Sunyavadins who hold that everything is void and unreal. All of them agree that everything is momentary. Nothing lasts beyond a moment. Things of the previous moment do not exist in the next moment. One appears and the next moment it is replaced by another. There is no connection between the one and the other. Everything is like a scene in a cinema which is produced by the successive appearance and disappearance of several isolated pictures.
The Realists recognise two aggregates, viz., the external material world and the internal mental world, which together make up the universe. The external world is made up of the aggregate of atoms, which are of four kinds, viz., atoms of earth which are solid, atoms of water which are viscid, atoms of fire which are hot and atoms of air which are mobile.
The five Skandhas or groups are the cause for the internal world. They are Rupa Skandha, Vijnana Skandha, Vedana Skandha, Samjna Skandha and Samskara Skandha. The senses and their objects form the Rupa Skandha. Vijnana Skandha is the stream of consciousness which gives the notion of egoism or 'I'. The Vedana Skandha comprises the feeling of pleasure and pain. The Samjna Skandha consists of names such as Ramakrishna, etc. All words thus constitute the Samjna Skandha. The fifth Skandha called Samskara Skandha consists of the attributes of the mind such as affection, hatred, delusion, merit (Dharma), demerit (Adharma), etc. All internal objects belong to any one of the last four Skandhas. The four last Skandhas form the internal objects. All activities depend upon the internal objects. The internal objects constitute the inner motive of everything. All external objects belong to one Skandha namely the Rupa Skandha. Thus the whole universe consists of these two kinds of objects, internal and external. The internal aggregate or the mental world is formed by the aggregate of the last four Skandhas. These are the two internal and external aggregates referred to in the Sutra.
The theory of the Bauddhas which classifies all objects under two heads, one aggregate being called the external, the other internal, is not sufficient to explain the world order; because all aggregates are unintelligent and there is no permanent intelligence admitted by the Bauddhas which can bring about this aggregation. Everything is momentary in its existence according to the Bauddhas. There is no permanent intelligent being who brings about the conjunction of these Skandhas. The continuation is not possible for these external atoms and internal sensations without the intervention of an intelligent guide. If it be said they come together of their own internal motion, then the world becomes eternal; because the Skandhas will be constantly bringing about creation as they are eternal and as they possess motion of their own. Thus this theory is untenable.
It cannot be explained how the aggregates are brought about, because the parts that constitute the material aggregates are destitute of intelligence. The Bauddhas do not admit any other permanent intelligent being such as enjoying soul or a ruling lord, which could effect the aggregation of atoms.
How are the aggregates formed? Is there any intelligent principle behind the aggregates as the Cause, the Guide, the Controller or the Director? Or does it take place spontaneously? If you say that there is an intelligent principle, is it permanent or momentary? If it is permanent, then the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness is opposed. If it is momentary, it must come into existence first and then unite the atoms. Then the cause should last more than one moment. If there is no intelligent principle as director or controller, how can non-intelligent atoms and the Skandhas aggregate in an orderly manner? Further, the creation would continue for ever. There would be no dissolution.
For all these reasons the formation of aggregates cannot be properly explained. Without aggregates there would be an end of the stream of earthly existence which presupposes those aggregates. Therefore, the doctrine of this school of Bauddhas is untenable and inadmissible.
Itaretarapratyayatvaditi chennotpattimatranimittatvat II.2.19 (190)
If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (nescience) standing in the relation of mutual causality, we say 'no'; they merely are the efficient cause of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links and not of the aggregation).
Itara-itara: mutual, one another; Pratyayatvat: because of being the cause, one being the cause of the other; Iti: thus; Chet: if; (Iti chet: if it be said); Na: no; Utpattimatranimittatvat: because they are merely the efficient cause of the origin.
An objection against Sutra 18 is raised and refuted.
The series beginning with nescience comprise the following members: Nescience, Samskara or impression, Vijnana (knowledge), name and form, the abode of the six (i.e., the body and the senses, contact, experience of pleasure and pain, desire, activity, merit, demerit, birth, species, decay, death, grief, lamentation, mental affliction and the like).
Nescience is the error of considering that what is momentary, impure, etc., to be permanent, pure, etc. Impression, (affection, Samskara) comprises desire, aversion, etc., and the activity caused by them. Knowledge (Vijnana) is the self-consciousness (Aham iti alayavijnanasya vrittilabhah) springing up in the embryo. Name and form is the rudimentary flake or bubble-like condition of the embryo. The abode of the six (Sadayatana) is the further developed stage of the embryo in which the latter is the abode of the six senses. Touch (Sparsa) is the sensation of cold, warmth, etc., on the embryo's part. Feeling (Vedana) is the sensation of pleasure and pain resulting therefrom. Desire (Trishna) is the wish to enjoy the pleasurable sensations and to shun the painful ones. Activity (Upadana) is the effort resulting from desire. Birth is the passing out from the uterus. Species (Jati) is the class of beings to which the new-born creature belongs. Decay (Jara), death (Marana) is explained as the condition of the creature when about to die (Mumursha). Grief (Soka) is the frustration of wishes connected therewith. Lament (Parivedana): the lamentations on that account. Pain (Duhkha) is such pain as caused by the five senses. Durmanas is mental affliction. The 'and the like' implies death, the departure to another world and the subsequent return from there.
The Buddhistic realist says: Although there exists no permanent intelligent principle of the nature either of a ruling Lord of an enjoying soul under whose influence the formation of the aggregates could take place, yet the course of earthly existence is rendered possible through the mutual causality of nescience (ignorance) and so on, so that we need not look for any other combining principle.
Nescience, Samskara, etc., constitute an uninterrupted chain of cause and effect. In the above series the immediately preceding item is the cause of the next. The wheel of cause and effect revolves unceasingly like the water-wheel and this cannot take place without aggregates. Hence aggregates are a reality.
We reply: Though in the series the preceding one is the cause of the subsequent one, there is nothing which can be the cause of the aggregates. It may be argued that the union of atom and the continuous flow of sensations are proved by the mutual interdependence existing among them. But the argument cannot stand, as this mutual interdependence cannot be the cause of their cohesion. Of two things one may produce the other, but that is no reason why they should unite together.
Even if Avidya (nescience), Samskara, Vijnana, Nama, and Rupa, etc., may without a sentient or intelligent agency pass from the stage of cause to the stage of effect, yet how can the totality of all these simultaneously exist without the will of a coordinating mind?
If you say that this aggregate or the world is formed by the mutual causation of Avidya and the rest, we say it is not so, because your link of causation explains only the origin of the subsequent from the previous. It only explains how Vijnana arises from Samskara, etc. It does not explain how the aggregate is brought about. An aggregate called Sanghata always shows a design and is brought about for the purpose of enjoyment. A Sanghata like a house may be explained to have been produced by putting together of bricks, mortar, etc., but they do not explain the design. You say that there is no permanent Atman. Your Atman is momentary only. You are a Kshanikatvavadin. There can be no enjoyment or experiencing for such a momentary soul; because the enjoying soul has not produced the merit or demerit whose fruits it has to enjoy. It was produced by another momentary soul. You cannot say that the momentary soul suffers the fruits of the acts done by its ancestral soul, for then that ancestral soul must be held to be permanent and not momentary. If you hold any soul to be permanent, it will contradict your theory of the momentariness of everything. But if you hold everything to be impermanent, your theory is open to the objection already made. Hence the doctrine of the Sanghatas (Buddhists) is untenable. It is not based on reason.
The atoms cannot combine by themselves even when they are assumed to be permanent and eternal. We have already shown this when examining the doctrine of the Vaiseshikas. Their combination is much more impossible when they are momentary.
The Bauddhas say that a combining principle of the atoms is not necessary if the atoms stand in a relation of causality. The atoms would combine by themselves. This is incorrect. The causality will explain only the production of atoms at different moments. It cannot certainly explain the union of the atom into an aggregate. The combination of an aggregate can take place only if there is an intelligent agent behind. Otherwise it is impossible to explain the union of inert and momentary atoms.
You will say that in the eternal Samsara the aggregates succeed one another in an unbroken chain and hence also Nescience and so on which abide in those aggregates. But in that case you will have to assume either that each aggregate necessarily produces another aggregate of the same kind, or that it may produce either a like or an unlike one without any settled or definite rule. In the former case a human body could never pass over into that of a god or an animal or a being of the infernal regions as like will go on producing like; in the latter case a man might in an instant become an elephant or a god and again become a man; either of which consequences would be contrary to your system.
The individual soul for whose enjoyment this aggregate of body etc., exists is also evanescent or momentary. It cannot therefore be an enjoyer. As the individual soul is momentary, whose is liberation? As there is no permanent enjoyer, there is no necessity for these aggregates. There may exist a causal relation between the members of the series consisting of Nescience, etc., but in the absence of a permanent enjoying soul, it is not possible to establish on that ground the existence of aggregates. Hence the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhist school of Realists cannot stand.
Uttarotpade cha purvanirodhat II.2.20 (191)
(Nor can there be a causal relation between nescience, etc.) because on the origination of the subsequent thing the preceding one ceases to be.
Uttarotpade: at the time of the production of the subsequent thing; Cha: and; Purvanirodhat: because the antecedent one has ceased to exist, because of the destruction of the previous thing. (Uttara: in the next, in the subsequent; Utpade: on the origination, on the production.)
The argument against the Buddhistic theory, commenced in Sutra 18, is continued.
We have hitherto argued that nescience and so on stand in a causal relation to each other merely, so that they cannot be made to account for the existence of the aggregates. We are now going to prove that they cannot even be regarded as efficient causes of the subsequent members of the series to which they belong.
According to the Buddhistic theory everything is momentary. A thing of the present moment vanishes in the next moment when its successor manifests. At the time of the appearance of a subsequent thing, the previous thing vanishes. Hence it is impossible for the previous thing to be the cause of the subsequent thing. Consequently the theory is untenable and inadmissible. It cannot stand to reason.
We always perceive that the cause subsists in the effect as the thread subsists in the cloth. But the Buddhists hold that existence originates from non-existence because they maintain that the effect cannot manifest without the destruction of the cause, the tree cannot appear until the seed is destroyed.
Even the passing of cause into effect in a series of successive states like nescience, etc., cannot take place, unless there is a coordinating intelligence. You say that everything has only a momentary existence. Your School cannot bring about the simultaneous existence of two successive moments. If the cause exists till it passes into the stage of effect, the theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) will vanish.
You may say that the former momentary existence when it has reached its full development becomes the cause of the later momentary existence. That also is impossible, because even that will require a successive or second moment for operation. This contradicts the doctrine of momentariness.
The theory of momentary existence (Kshanikatva) cannot stand. The gold that exists at the time the ornament is made is alone the cause of the ornament and not that which existed before and has ceased to exist then. If it be still held to be the cause, then existence will come out of non-existence. This is not possible. The theory of momentariness will contradict the doctrine that the effect is the cause in a new form. This doctrine indicates that the cause exists in the effect. This shows that it is not momentary. Further, origination and destruction will be the same owing to momentariness. If it is said that there is difference between origination and destruction, then we will have to say that the thing lasts for more than one moment. Hence we have again to declare the doctrine of momentariness to be untenable.
Asati pratijnoparodho yaugapadyamanyatha II.2.21 (192)
If non-existence (of cause) be assumed, (while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle or proposition. Otherwise there would result simultaneity (of cause and effect).
Asati: in the case of non-existence of cause, if it be admitted that an effect is produced without a cause; Pratijna: proposition, admitted principle; Uparodhah: contradiction, denial; Yaugapadyam: simultaneity, simultaneous existence; Anyatha: otherwise.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
If the Buddhists say that an effect is produced without a cause then they would contradict their own proposition that every effect has a cause. The proposition admitted by Buddhists that the consciousness of blue, etc., arises when mind, eye, light and object act in union as cause will fail. All sorts of effects can co-exist.
If a cause be assumed then we have to accept that the cause and effect exist simultaneously at the next moment. The cause exists for more than one moment. The cause exists till the state of effect is reached. Then the doctrine of momentariness will fail.
Pratisankhyapratisankhyanirodhapraptiravicchedat II.2.22 (193)
Conscious and unconscious destruction would be impossible on account of non-interruption.
Pratisankhya nirodha: conscious destruction, destruction due to some cause or agency; causal destruction, destruction depending upon the volition of conscious entity; Apratisankhya nirodha: unconscious destruction, destruction not depending upon any voluntary agency; Apraptih: non-attainment, impossibility; Avicchedat: because of non-interruption, because it goes on without interruption.
The argument against the theory of the Buddhists is continued.
The Buddhists hold that universal destruction is ever going on and that this destruction or cessation is of two kinds, viz., conscious and unconscious. Conscious destruction depends upon an act of thought as when a man breaks a jar having previously formed the intention of doing so. Unconscious destruction is the natural decay of objects.
The flow of cause and effect goes on without interruption and therefore cannot be subject to either kind of destruction. Nor can any individual antecedent of a series be said to be totally destroyed, as it is recognised in its immediate consequence.
Both kinds of destruction or cessation are impossible because it must refer either to the series of momentary existences or to the single members constituting the series.
The former alternative is not possible because in all series of momentary existences the members of the series stand in an unbroken relation of cause and effect so that the series cannot be interrupted. The latter alternative is similarly not admissible, because it is not possible to hold that any momentary existence should undergo complete annihilation entirely undefinable and disconnected with the previous state of existence, as we observe that a thing is recognised in the various states through which it may pass and thus has a connected existence. When an earthen jar is destroyed we find the existence of the clay in the potsherds or fragments into which the jar is broken or in the powder into which the potsherds are ground. We infer that even though what seems to vanish altogether such as a drop of water which has fallen on heated iron, yet continues to exist in some other form, viz., as steam.
The series of momentary existence forming a chain of causes and effect is continuous and can never be stopped, because the last momentary existence before its annihilation must be supposed either to produce its effect or not to produce it. If it does, then the series is continued and will not be destroyed. If it does not produce the effect, the last link does not really exist as the Bauddhas define Satta of a thing as its causal efficiency and the non-existence of the last link would lead backward to the non-existence of the whole series.
We cannot have then two kinds of destruction in the individual members of the series also. Conscious destruction is not possible on account of the momentary existence of each member. There cannot be unconscious destruction as the individual member is not totally annihilated. Destruction of a thing really means only change of condition of the substance.
You cannot say that when a candle is burnt out, it is totally annihilated. When a candle burns out, it is not lost but undergoes a change of condition. We do not certainly perceive the candle when it is burnt out, but the materials of which it consisted continue to exist in a very subtle state and hence they are imperceptible.
For these reasons the two kinds of destruction which the Bauddhas assume cannot be proved.
Ubhayatha cha doshat II.2.23 (194)
And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.
Ubhayatha: in either case; Cha: and, also; Doshat: because of objections.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
There is a fallacy in either view, i.e., that Avidya or ignorance is destroyed by right knowledge or self-destroyed.
According to the Buddhistic view, emancipation is the annihilation of ignorance. Salvation or freedom is attained when ignorance is destroyed. Ignorance (Avidya or nescience) is the false idea of permanency in things which are momentary.
The ignorance can be annihilated by the adoption of some means such as penance, knowledge, etc., (conscious destruction); or it may destroy itself (spontaneity). But both the alternatives are defective. Because this annihilation of ignorance cannot be attained by the adoption of penance or the like; for the mean like every other thing, is also momentary according to the Buddhistic view and is, therefore, not likely to produce such annihilation; annihilation cannot take place of its own accord, for in that case all Buddhistic instructions, the disciplines and methods of meditation for the attainment of emancipation will be useless.
According to the Buddhistic theory, there can be no voluntary exertion on the part of the aspirant for the breaking asunder of his continued worldly experiences or nescience. There is no hope of their ever coming to an end by mere exhaustion as the causes continue to generate their effects which again continue to generate their own effects and so on and there is no occasion left for practices for attaining release.
Thus in the Buddhistic system release or freedom can never be established. The teaching of the Buddhists cannot stand the test of reasoning.
Aakase chaviseshat II.2.24 (195)
The cause of Akasa (ether) also not being different (from the two other kinds of destruction it also cannot be a non-entity.)
Akase: in the case of Akasa or ether; Cha: also, and; Aviseshat: because of no specific difference.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
We have shown in Sutras 22-23 that the two kinds of destruction (cessation) are not totally destitute of all positive characteristics and so cannot be non-entities. We now proceed to show the same with regard to space (ether, Akasa).
The Buddhists do not recognise the existence of Akasa. They regard Akasa as a non-entity. Akasa is nothing but the absence of covering or occupying body (Avaranabhava). This is un-reasonable. Akasa has the quality of sound, just as earth has smell, water taste, fire form, air touch. Akasa also is a distinct entity like earth, water, etc. Hence there is no reason why Akasa also should be rejected as a non-entity, while earth, water, etc., are recognised as being entities.
Just as earth, air, etc., are regarded as entities on account of their being the substratum of attributes like smell, etc., so also Akasa should be considered as an entity on account of its being the substratum of sound, earth, water, etc., that are experienced through their respective qualities, viz., smell, taste, form, touch. The existence of Akasa is experienced through its quality, sound. Hence Akasa also must be an entity.
Space is inferred from its attribute of sound, just as earth is inferred from smell. Where there is relation of substance and attribute there must be an object. The Buddhists hold that space is mere non-existence of matter (Avaranabhavamatram). If so, a bird may fall down as there is no obstructive matter, but how can it fly up? Non-existence of matter is space which is a positive object and not mere negation or non-entity.
The doctrine that Akasa is an absolute non-entity is not tenable. Why do you say so? Aviseshat, because there is no difference in the case of Akasa from any other kind of substance which is an object of perception. We perceive space when we say, "the crow flies in space." The space, therefore, is as much a real substance as the earth, etc. As we know the earth by its quality of smell, water by its quality of taste, and so on, so we know from the quality of being the abode of objects, the existence of space, and that it has the quality of sound. Thus Akasa is a real substance and not a non-entity.
If Akasa be a non-entity, then the entire world would become destitute of space.
Scriptural passages declare "Space sprang from the Atman" (Atmana akasassambhutah). So Akasa is a real thing. It is a Vastu (existing object) and not non-existence.
O Buddhists! You say that air exists in Akasa. In the Bauddha scriptures, a series of questions and answers beginning "On which, O revered Sir, is the earth founded?" in which the following question occurs, "On which is the air founded?" to which it is replied that the air is founded on space (ether). Now it is clear that this statement is appropriate only on the supposition of space being a positive entity, not a mere negation. If Akasa was totally non-existent, what would be the receptacle of air?
You cannot say that space is nothing but the absence of any occupying object. This also cannot stand to reason. If you say that space is nothing but the absence in general of any covering or occupying body, then when one bird is flying, whereby space is occupied, there would be no room for a second bird which wishes to fly at the same time. You may give an answer that the second bird may fly there where there is absence of a covering body. But we declare that that something by which the absence of covering bodies is distinguished must be a positive entity, viz., space in our sense and not the mere non-existing of covering bodies.
Moreover, there is a self-contradiction in the statements of Buddhists with reference to the three kinds of negative entities (Nirupakhya). They say that the negative entities are not positively definable, and also are eternal. It is absurd to talk of a non-being as being eternal or evanescent. The distinction of subjects and predicates of attribution totally rests on real things. Where there is such distinction, there exists the real thing such as pot, etc., which is not a mere undefinable negation or non-entity.
Anusmritescha II.2.25 (196)
And on account of memory the things are not momentary.
Anusmriteh: on account of memory; Cha: and.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
The theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is refuted here. If everything is momentary the experiencer of something must also be momentary. But the experiencer is not momentary, because people have the memory of past experiences. Memory can take place only in a man who has previously experienced it, because we observe that what one man has experienced is not remembered by another man. It is not that the experience is that one sees and another remembers. Our experience is "I saw and I now remember what I saw." He who experiences and remembers is the same. He is connected with at least two moments. This certainly refutes the theory of momentariness.
The Buddhists may say that memory is due to similarity. But unless there be one permanent knowing subject, who can perceive the similarity in the past with the present. One cannot say "This is the pot, this is the chair which was in the past." So long there is not the same soul which saw and which now remembers, how can mere similarity bring about such a consciousness as "I saw and I now remember (Pratyabhijna)?" The knowing subject must be permanent and not momentary.
Doubt may arise with reference to an external object. You may not be able to say whether it is identically the same object which was perceived in the past or something similar to it. But with reference to the Self, the cognising subject, there can never arise any such doubt whether I am the same who was in the past, for it is impossible that the memory of a thing perceived by another should exist in one's own Self.
If you say that this, the thing remembered, is like that, the thing seen, in that case also two things are connected by one agent. If the thing perceived was separate and ceased totally, it cannot be referred at all. Moreover the experience is not that "this is like that" but that "this is that."
We admit that sometimes with reference to an external thing a doubt may arise whether it is that or merely is similar to that; because mistake may occur concerning what lies outside our minds. But the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it is itself or only similar to itself. It is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject which yesterday had a certain sensation and remembers that sensation today. Does any one doubt whether he who remembers is the same as he who saw?
For this reason also the theory of momentariness of the Buddhists is to be rejected.
We do not perceive objects coming into existence in a moment or vanishing in a moment. Thus the theory of momentariness of all things is refuted.
Nasato'dristatvat II.2.26 (197)
(Existence or entity does) not (spring) from non-existence or non-entity, because it is not seen.
Na: not; Asatah: from non-existence, of the unreal, of a non-entity; Adrishtatvat: because it is not seen.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
A non-entity has not been observed to produce entity. Therefore it does not stand to reason to suppose non-entity to be the cause.
The Bauddhas (Vainasikas) assert that no effect can be produced from anything that is unchanging and eternal, because an unchanging thing cannot produce an effect. So they declare that the cause perishes before the effect is produced. They say from the decomposed seed only the young plant springs, spoilt milk only turns into curds, and the lump of clay has ceased to be a lump when it becomes a pot. So existence comes out of non-existence.
According to the view of the Buddhists, a real thing, i.e., the world has come into existence out of nothing. But experience shows that this theory is false. A pot for instance is never found to be produced without clay. Such a hypothetical production can only exist in the imagination, for example, the child of a barren woman. Hence the view of the Buddhists is untenable and inadmissible.
If existence can come out of non-existence, if being can proceed from non-being, then the assumption of special causes would have no meaning at all. Then anything may come out of anything, because non-entity is one and the same in all cases. There is no difference between the non-entity of a mango seed and that of a jack-seed. Hence a jack tree may come out of a mango seed. Sprouts also may originate from the horns of hares. If there are different kinds of non-existence, having special distinctions just as for instance, blueness and the like are the special qualities of lotuses and so on, the non-existence of a mango seed will differ from that of a jack-seed, and then this would turn non-entities into entities.
Moreover if existence springs from non-existence all effects would be affected with non-existence, but they are seen to be positive entities with their various special characteristics.
The horn of a hare is non-existent. What can come out from that horn? We see only being emerging from being, e.g., ornament from gold, etc.
According to the Bauddhas, all mind and all mental modifications spring from the four Skandhas and all material aggregates from the atoms. And yet they say at the same time that entity is born of non-entity. This is certainly quite inconsistent and self-contradictory. They stultify their own doctrine and needlessly confuse the minds of every one.
Udasinanamapi chaivam siddhih II.2.27 (198)
And thus (if existence should spring from non-existence, there would result) the attainment of the goal by the indifferent and non-active people also.
Udasianam: of the indifferent and non-active; Api: even, also; Cha: and; Evam: thus; Siddih: success accomplishment, and attainment of the goal.
The argument against the Buddhistic theory is continued.
If it were admitted that existence or entity springs from non-existence or non entity, lazy inactive people also would attain their purpose. Rice will grow even if the farmer does not cultivate his field. Jars will shape themselves even if the potter does not fashion the clay. The weaver too will have finished pieces of cloth without weaving. No body will have to exert himself in the least either for going to the heavenly world or for attaining final emancipation. All this is absurd and not maintained by anybody.
Thus the doctrine of the origination of existence or entity from non-existence or non-entity is untenable or inadmissible.