Immanuel Kant tried to bring about a reconciliation between these two views of reality and knowledge. The rationalists are right, and the empiricists are also right in one way. The rationalists are wrong, and the empiricists are also wrong in another way: They are taking an extreme stand, and therefore they are not giving the entire picture of what is actually happening when man knows an object. It is true that without the contact of the senses with objects one cannot know anything in the world. But, it is also true that unless there is a receptive capacity in one's own self, which is of the essential character of knowledge, one would not be able to assimilate these sensations and organise them into perception, or knowledge.

There is a little difference between the analysis made in Western circles and the Eastern ones, so far as the inner components of the psyche are concerned. Mostly, Western psychologists confine themselves to the threefold classification of the psyche into understanding, willing and feeling. Though the psychological organ can be dissected into minute formations, these three attitudes of the mind in the process of knowledge may be regarded as the essential ones so far as the study of epistemology is concerned. The German philosopher Kant wrote three volumes, viz., The Critique of Pure Reason, The Critique of Practical Reason, and The Critique of Judgment, which are voluminous expositions of the implications that follow from a study of these three functions, understanding, willing and feeling. In the East, the focus on the mind has been of a different nature, though this threefold activity of the mind is accepted. The internal organ, which is called Antahkarana, is usually understood to perform four functions, on account of which it is called by four different names or designations - Manas, Buddhi, Chitta and Ahamkara. These are Sanskrit words correspondingly meaning the mind which thinks; the intellect which understands; the subconscious, which remembers or functions as memory of experience; and the ego, which arrogates all things to itself, and maintains perpetual self consciousness.

From the materialist standpoint, knowledge would be utterly impossible, because knowledge is not the nature of the object. The object is material; it is not conscious. Further, it is impossible to imagine how knowledge can be extracted from an object, and brought within the perceiver's mind so that he may know that the object is there. Even taking for granted that knowledge is located in the objects outside, how could it be transferred to the perceiver, and how could it become a part of his being? How could there be unity between the essentiality within man, the perceiving centrality, and the knowledge that has come from outside? Unless there is something akin to knowledge in one's own being, knowledge of things would be impossible. Total dissimilarities do not join together. There must be a similarity of character in order that there may be a union of things. Even if there is a union of the object with the subject in the rising of knowledge, there should be something in the object, and something in the subject, similar to what is known as knowledge.

The rationalists feel that knowledge is inborn in the human being. It is already within us; it has only to be brought out by certain means, and these means are the sensory activities or the empiric operations. Socrates held the view that all knowledge is within. The Greeks were fond of the great dictum, "Know Thyself." It is not necessary to probe into the nature of the object outside. Man has to know himself, and then he knows all things. To know one's own self is to have true knowledge. This is the essential forte of the rationalist doctrine.

Why does any difficulty arise? How is it that this problem of a conflict has arisen between two parties contending with each other? Can a deeper analysis be done to find out the source of this conflict itself? Why is it that one says this, and another says that as the final word? And; how is it that sometimes there is a feeling that both are right in some way, though neither seems to be wholly right?

The way we know that an object exists is the subject of epistemology. The process through which one is passing in an act of knowledge is an everyday experience of people. Only, no one appears to bestow sufficient attention on it. The process involves the functions which are cognitive, conative and affective. This will be clear when one studies the way in which one becomes aware of things after one wakes up from sleep. One has to be careful in this analysis of what one is passing through after waking. Mostly, there is no time to make such an analysis. How does one get up from deep sleep and then become conscious that there is a world outside? In sleep nothing is known; neither is there the awareness of one's own existence, nor the awareness of the existence of anybody else. When one is woken up from sleep, what is the type of awareness that one entertains immediately after waking? Is it an act of perception of the world outside? No, one is not suddenly aware of things. There is a bare, indeterminate consciousness. One is merely aware. One is half sleepy, and yet the sleep has gone. The weight of sleep is hanging over still, but the darkness of it is no more and the light which peeps through this cloud of unknowing, sleep, has awakened the person into a kind of consciousness which cannot be adequately described in language. It is not consciousness of anything. Perhaps, one does not even become conscious of one's own existence in a proper, definable manner. And in the next stage there is just self consciousness. One feels that one is. And even when one feels that one is, one is not very clear about things. There is an unclear notion about oneself. The duties, the worries and the anxieties of the world have not yet risen in a concrete form when one is aware that one exists, but yet one is not fully aware of the implications of this consciousness of one's existence.

Since everyone passes through this stage rapidly, no one is able to make an analysis of it properly. Like a picture in a moving show of portraits, one sees a rapid motion of the presentation, on account of which the details cannot be counted or even be visualised quickly. Nevertheless, they are shows of moving pieces or bits of portraits. Likewise, there is a rapid movement of experience through which everyone is passing after waking from sleep. One has not woken up fully; the walls are not seen, but something is visible as existing outside. The indeterminate awareness of the presence of things outside becomes later a determinate perception: this is a wall, this is a door, this is a window. This idea is a later consequence that follows from one's rising from sleep. All these things can take place in just one minute. Yet, within this one minute, one has passed through all these stages.

When this concrete knowledge of the nature of objects around is obtained, there is a modification of the mind, which Patanjali calls Aklishta-vritti, or a psychosis which is non-pain-giving - non-pain-giving in the sense that it is merely an awareness of the presence of the characteristic of an object, and nothing else is associated with it. But when an affective note, the emotional or the feeling aspect is associated with it, the awareness of the object becomes more accentuated: 'It is mine; this is not mine'. The feelings of like and dislike, or rather, love and hatred, get associated with the bare perception of the object. This is a further development. When one is aware of the existence of an object, it is not suddenly associated with love and hatred. But later on it becomes 'mine' or 'not mine'. For instance, one may see something standing in front of oneself. This is an indeterminate perception of the object. And when this perception, which is indeterminate, becomes more clear, one becomes aware that it is a man standing, it is not anything else. A consciousness of the fact that a human being is standing there is more concrete than the earlier bare consciousness. A mere awareness of the fact of a being standing need not necessarily get associated with love and hatred. But this Aklishta-vritti, or the mere perceptive act, or the knowledge of the existence of a human being in front, can suddenly transform itself into the consciousness of a person who is liked or hated - 'Oh, this is the person! Oh, when did you come? Please come; sit down.' One shakes hands if it is a dear friend. Or, if it is an abominable individual, he is hated from the bottom of the heart. One shuts up and shrinks away from that individual. This psychosis is called Klishta-vritti, according to Patanjali, a condition of the mind which is pain-giving - not like the earlier one which was non-pain-giving. A mere awareness of the presence of an object does not give pain. But when it is connected with specific feelings, it rouses sentiments of like and dislike. Then the attitude towards the object gets conditioned by this process of perception which is associated with the affective emphasis of like and dislike. Then it is not merely a looking at the wall. 'It is the wall or the building which belongs to me,' is something that follows from the mere act of perception of the existence of a wall.

There is a mysterious mixing up or a blend of the various functions of the psyche, the internal organ, when it becomes aware of an object. This affective perception of the object, or rather, the emotional cognition of an object, drives one into action, and activity proceeds as a result of perception which is of this nature or that nature. Something lying on the ground may be seen. And when it is seen clearly and the awareness that it is a snake arises, everyone knows what activities are stimulated within the system, merely because of the consciousness that it is a snake that is lying on the floor.

All activities can be regarded as a procession of reactions set up by a movement of the psyche in various ways, in accordance with the emphasis laid upon it by any particular phase of its function, cognitive, conative or affective, understanding, willing or feeling. But all these functions act so rapidly that one appears to be inseparable from the other. Everyone understands, wills and feels at the same time, as it were. 'I know that there is such a thing in front of me, and I feel something about it and I decide upon an action in regard to it at once.' This 'at once' is only a way of saying. It is not really an at-once action. It is a series of processes that has taken place within the mind. Thus, perception is not an impartial knowledge of things. It is a highly conditioned way of looking at things, and man is not seeing things as they really are. We live in a world of appearance. This is one aspect of the issue, a partial phase which describes how no one is living in a real world, but a world which is highly conditioned by the reactions one sets up in regard to the nature of things.